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November 13, 2026
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23
 min read

How to Detect Shadow AI: Shadow AI Detection for Tools and Agents (2026)

Shadow AI detection, step by step: the network, browser and endpoint layers, the signals that expose shadow AI agents, and what to do once you find them.

How to Detect Shadow AI: Shadow AI Detection for Tools and Agents (2026)
ChatGPT
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Google AI
Claude
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TL;DR

Shadow AI is any AI tool or AI agent used without IT's knowledge or approval, and you cannot govern what you cannot see. Shadow AI detection works at three layers, network, browser and endpoint, and the endpoint is the most complete because it also catches desktop clients, IDE plugins, CLI scripts and local agents. Agents add a fourth layer: provider control planes (OAuth grants, app installs, AgentCore runtimes, compliance APIs) joined with endpoint and browser sensors. Strac runs all of it from one platform, names the service, the app, the device, the user and the sensitive data involved, and never reads prompts or logs keystrokes.

Shadow AI is any AI tool used without IT's knowledge or approval, and you can't govern what you can't see. Two years ago that meant an employee pasting a customer list into ChatGPT. Today it also means a Claude Code session with an OAuth grant to Google Drive, a Zapier automation signing into HubSpot with a shared login, and a computer-use agent driving an already-open Salesforce tab. The tools got agents, and the agents act on their own.

This guide is the method for shadow AI detection: where shadow AI hides, the warning signs, the three detection layers and what each can and cannot see, a fourth layer for detecting shadow AI agents specifically, a worked example of attributing an action to an agent the provider never saw, and what to do with each thing you find. If you want a comparison of products instead, see shadow AI detection tools. If you want the full program around agents, start with AI agent security.

The short version:

  • Shadow AI is any AI tool used without IT's knowledge or approval, and you can't govern what you can't see.
  • Detection happens at three layers, network, browser, and endpoint, and the endpoint is the most complete because it catches desktop clients, IDE plugins, and CLI scripts too.
  • Good detection answers four questions: which AI service, by which app, on which device and user, and whether sensitive data was involved, without reading prompts or logging keystrokes.
  • Shadow AI agents need one more question answered: which identity the agent runs as, because that identity is what you will revoke.
Strac shadow AI agents view listing 41 unsanctioned agents, how each was found, who uses it, its sensitive reach and a decision
The shadow AI agents queue: 41 unsanctioned agents, 11 that can reach sensitive data, 17 found only by the endpoint or browser sensors, and 26 local MCP servers across 19 workstations. Each row shows how Strac found it and offers one decision.

✨ What Is Shadow AI Detection?

Detection without triage just produces a long list. Strac pairs discovery with AI security posture management so the riskiest setups, such as an agent holding a production database credential, surface first.

Shadow AI detection is the practice of finding the AI tools your workforce uses without approval, mapping them to devices and users, and spotting when sensitive data comes near them. It is the first step of any shadow-AI program: you cannot write a usable AI policy, size the risk, or enforce anything until you can see what is actually happening across the fleet.

The challenge is that AI adoption is bottom-up. Employees sign up for ChatGPT, install a Copilot plugin, or paste a customer list into a niche summarizer long before IT hears about it. Detection turns that invisible sprawl into a live inventory you can act on.

Strac comparison of network, browser and endpoint shadow AI detection coverage, showing where each approach sees AI use and where it goes blind
Where each detection approach sees shadow AI, and where it goes blind. The endpoint is the only vantage point that covers browser, desktop, and CLI paths.

Why Shadow AI Is Uniquely Hard to Detect

Traditional shadow-IT discovery looked for unsanctioned SaaS logins and expense-report subscriptions. Shadow AI is harder for three reasons. First, it is everywhere: there are thousands of AI tools and new ones weekly, so domain blocklists are always out of date. Second, it is not just browser-based: desktop assistants, IDE plugins, and scripts calling AI APIs never touch a web login. Third, the risky action is a paste or a file pick that takes one second, so point-in-time audits miss it.

Agents add a fourth reason. An agent does not need to reach an AI domain from the device you are watching. It can run in a vendor's cloud, authenticate with an OAuth grant a user approved months ago, and read Drive files through Google's own API. Nothing on the network looks unusual, and the audit log attributes every read to the human who approved the grant.

Where Shadow AI Hides: Browsers, Laptops, SaaS and MCP

  • The browser: ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, and hundreds of niche tools and AI browser extensions.
  • Desktop apps: the ChatGPT and Claude desktop clients, Copilot, and AI features baked into everyday software.
  • IDE plugins: Copilot, Cursor, and other coding assistants that read local files and send context to a model.
  • CLI and scripts: a terminal command or a cron job hitting an AI API directly, invisible to anything watching the browser.
  • Mobile and personal devices: outside managed endpoints entirely, the hardest gap to close.
  • Provider control planes: OAuth grants in Google Workspace, app installs in Slack and GitHub, connected apps and Agentforce bots in Salesforce, AgentCore runtimes in AWS. This is where shadow AI agents hide, and no amount of traffic inspection finds them.
  • Local MCP servers: a config file on a developer's laptop that gives an agent a tool for Postgres, GitHub or the shell. See shadow MCP for why these are the fastest-growing blind spot.

The Warning Signs of Shadow AI

Even without a dedicated tool, a few signals hint at shadow AI: a rise in outbound traffic to known AI domains, new AI extensions appearing in browsers, employees pasting large blocks of text into unfamiliar sites, unmanaged AI desktop apps showing up in software inventories, and the one that matters most: sensitive files being opened by AI applications. The problem is that these signals are scattered across tools; detection's job is to unify them.

For agents, the warning signs live in admin consoles rather than on the wire: a new third-party OAuth client with Drive or Gmail scopes, a Slack app whose scopes expanded last week, a GitHub App installed on all repositories, an IAM role with a name that ends in "-agent" and no owner tag, and a Salesforce integration user that is suddenly the busiest account in the org.

✨ The Three Layers of Shadow AI Detection

There are three places you can watch for AI use, and they see very different things. Understanding the trade-offs is the key to choosing an approach that actually covers your risk. Agents add a fourth layer, covered after the three methods below.

Strac diagram of the shadow AI detection layers, network and CASB, browser, endpoint and agents, showing what each layer sees and misses
The endpoint is the most complete layer for AI tools. For agents, provider control planes find the grants and runtimes, and the browser and endpoint sensors find the agents that borrow a human's session.

Method 1: Can CASB and Network Tools Detect Shadow AI?

Only partly. Network and CASB tools inspect outbound traffic and flag connections to known AI domains. This is broad and agentless, which makes it easy to start with. But it is blind to anything that does not leave through the inspected network path, desktop clients on a home network, CLI scripts, and encrypted context, and it struggles to tie a connection to a specific user, app, or file. It tells you that an AI domain was reached, rarely who did it or what data was involved. For a side-by-side of what CASB, EDR, OAuth scanning and DLP each catch, see the detection comparison in our shadow AI guide.

✨ Method 2: Browser-Based Detection

A browser extension sees AI use inside the browser, including what was typed or pasted into a web AI tool, and can tie it to the signed-in user. That is valuable, but it only covers the browser. Every desktop assistant, IDE plugin, and script is invisible to it. For organizations where developers and power users drive AI adoption, that is a large blind spot.

Strac Browser DLP blocking sensitive data from reaching a web GenAI tool such as ChatGPT or Claude in real time
Strac Browser DLP catching sensitive data before it reaches a web AI tool like ChatGPT or Claude, in real time. Many teams run Strac specifically for web GenAI DLP.

✨ Method 3: Detect Shadow AI on Endpoints and Laptops

On laptops and desktops, the endpoint is the most complete vantage point. An endpoint agent watches AI use from the device itself, so it covers the browser and desktop clients, plugins, and scripts. It ties each connection to the device and user, names managed versus unmanaged tools, and, critically, can tell when a sensitive file or piece of text came near an AI tool. This is why the endpoint is the recommended vantage point: it is the only one that sees every path and connects AI activity to real data.

Strac Shadow AI dashboard showing AI destinations, managed vs unmanaged, and sensitive data touching AI
On the endpoint, Strac names the AI services reached, splits managed from unmanaged, and flags sensitive data touching AI, never the prompt itself.

🤖 How to Discover and Control Shadow AI Agents

The three layers above detect AI tools: a person, a device, a destination. Shadow AI agents break that model, because an agent is software that chooses its own next action and borrows an identity to do it. The question changes from "which AI service did this device reach" to "what is acting, which identity does it run as, what can that identity do, and what did it do." That is the four-question frame from AI agent security, and detection is the first of the four.

Agents leave evidence in two places, and most agents show up in only one of them.

The first is the provider control plane: the admin API and audit log of the system the agent connects to. Google's Admin SDK lists every third-party OAuth token per user by client_id and scope, and its token audit shows which client called which API on whose behalf. Slack's admin APIs list apps, scopes and channel grants, and its audit log records installs and scope expansions. GitHub exposes App installations with repository selection, and its enterprise audit log tags Copilot agent actions with actor_is_agent=true and an agent_session_id. AWS AgentCore returns each runtime's roleArn and workload identity, which CloudTrail then attributes actions to. Salesforce Event Monitoring now carries ConnectedAppID, BotId, BotSessionId and ServiceName on API events, and MCP servers can appear as agentic-api-service. The Anthropic Compliance API covers Claude Enterprise, Cowork and local Claude Code sessions (but not Claude via Bedrock or Vertex). OpenAI's Compliance Logs cover ChatGPT conversations, auth and every connected-app call, with 30-day source retention. Cursor's admin API gives members and audit events, with no prompts or generated code.

The second is the sensor: the endpoint, browser or MCP client where the agent actually runs. The endpoint sees local claude, codex and cursor processes, the shell and tool commands they run, and the files and domains they touch. A scan of ~/.cursor/mcp.json and claude_desktop_config.json lists every local MCP server a developer has wired up, with its command and environment; Strac's MCP DLP sensor then records the live tool calls. An endpoint secrets scan finds the API keys, PATs and tokens in shell profiles and .env files that agents authenticate with (identity pattern D). And the browser sensor records when a computer-use agent takes control of a tab the human was already logged into, what it clicked and what it downloaded.

Signal, source, proof, confidence

Signal
Source
What it proves
Confidence
OAuth grant by client_id
Google Admin SDK tokens, Reports token audit
A user authorized an AI client with specific scopes; the client called APIs on their behalf
High (pattern A)
Slack app inventory and scope changes
Slack admin apps APIs, Audit Logs API
An app with these scopes and channel grants exists; when it was installed or expanded
High for existence; agent classification needs a vendor registry
GitHub App install and agent session
GitHub installations API, enterprise audit log
Repo selection and permissions; a Copilot agent session acted for a named user
Very high (actor_is_agent, agent_session_id)
AgentCore runtime and role
AgentCore control plane, IAM, CloudTrail
A cloud agent runs as this role; the role performed these actions
High (pattern C); shared roles stay as candidates
Salesforce connected app and bot fields
External Client Apps, Event Monitoring ApiEvent
API calls came through this app, bot or MCP service
Medium (shared principal with an app field)
Vendor session
Anthropic Compliance API, OpenAI Compliance Logs
A user ran Claude, Cowork, Claude Code or ChatGPT; app and tool calls happened
Very high for the vendor session; downstream join needs more evidence
Cursor audit event
Cursor admin API
A member used this Cursor surface at this time
High for use; no content or action detail
Local agent process
Strac endpoint sensor
An agent ran on this device, as this user, touched these files, reached these domains
High for presence; correlated for provider attribution
MCP config file
Strac endpoint config scan
This server, command and environment are available to the agent on this workstation
High for existence; use needs the MCP sensor
MCP tool call
Strac MCP sensor
This session invoked this tool against this resource with this data in request or response
Very high for did
Secret in execution environment
Strac endpoint secrets scan
A static credential is present where an agent runs; pattern D identity
Medium for ownership
Agent-driven browser session
Strac browser and endpoint sensors
A named agent process controlled a tab the human was logged into, and what it clicked and downloaded
Low to medium, labeled correlated

Two rules keep this table honest. First, do not call every service account, bot or OAuth app an AI agent; keep "is an agent" and "is a non-human identity" as separate flags, or the real risk drowns in CI bots and backup accounts. Second, never present weak attribution as fact. The UI must say whether a link is provider-attributed, Strac-correlated or inferred, so a reviewer can disagree with it. The deeper treatment of these patterns is in discover AI agents.

✨ A Worked Example: Who Exported the Salesforce Report?

Here is the case that defeats every API-only shadow AI detection approach.

Alice is logged into Salesforce in Chrome. Salesforce Event Monitoring records a ReportExport by Alice: 2,310 rows, no connected app, no bot ID, no MCP service name. From the provider's point of view, a human exported a report. There is nothing to detect.

The endpoint and browser sensors on Alice's laptop saw something else in the same 43 seconds. A Cowork process took control of the Chrome tab that had Salesforce open. The agent issued a tool call, browser.click("Export"). A CSV landed in Downloads. The agent process then read that file and sent a request to api.anthropic.com.

Strac correlated finding: Salesforce Event Monitoring shows Alice exported a report while Strac endpoint and browser sensors show the Cowork agent drove her session
Left: everything Salesforce knows. Right: what the endpoint and browser sensors saw in the same window. Strac joins the two into a High finding, labels the attribution "correlated," and lists the factors behind it: a 43-second overlap, the same tab, and file lineage from download to agent read.

Three things to notice. The attribution is deliberately marked correlated, not provider-native, because Salesforce never said an agent did it. The confidence factors are shown rather than folded into a score, so an analyst can argue with them. And the finding is High, because the export contains customer records and the destination is an external AI endpoint, which is a sensitive-data touch regardless of who or what pressed the button.

This is identity pattern E, the browser or session identity, and it is growing fastest because computer-use agents are the easiest kind to deploy. Pattern F, an automation signing in with a shared username and password, looks the same from the provider's side. Both are invisible to any tool that only reads admin APIs. The browser and endpoint sensors that already power the three detection layers above are what close the gap.

What to Do Once You Detect Shadow AI Agents

Detection without a decision is a spreadsheet. Every newly discovered agent should move through the same short workflow.

  1. Classify: agent or plain non-human identity. A Zapier connection that moves leads is an automation; a Claude Code session that chooses which repo to edit is an agent. Store the flag separately from "is non-human." Only agents get agent-grade controls.
  2. Resolve the identity pattern. Delegated OAuth, app or bot identity, cloud workload, static key, browser session, or shared login. The pattern decides how confident the attribution is and which revocation path exists.
  3. Request an owner. An agent with no accountable owner and either recent activity or a live credential is a High finding every time. Send the owner request to the user who approved the grant, installed the app, or whose device runs the process. The queue above shows 41 owner requests waiting.
  4. Decide: sanction, block, revoke, or disable. Sanction plus owner for the agents the business wants, with the credential scoped to what it uses. Block at the data layer for unsanctioned agents that can reach regulated data. Revoke the OAuth grant where the provider offers a bounded admin API (Google does, by client_id). Disable the runtime or restrict the app where that is the provider-supported path. Anything else gets a review ticket with a deep link to the console.
  5. Grant exceptions with an expiry. A sales ops team that needs its Agentforce bot live through quarter close gets an exception that ends on a date, not a snoozed alert. Expired exceptions reopen the finding.

Every decision is reversible or clearly labeled when it is not, and discovery stays read-only until you opt into write access per provider. The policy side of this, owner requirements, staleness windows and what "sanctioned" means, is covered in AI agent governance. Keeping the sanctioned ones honest over time is monitoring AI agents.

Detecting Sensitive Data Touching AI

Knowing that ChatGPT was reached is useful; knowing that a file with 42 SSNs was opened by an AI app, or that a customer export was picked into an upload to an unmanaged tool, is what turns detection into risk management. Strac correlates AI activity with content classification, so a shadow-AI event carries the data classes involved, PII, PHI, PCI, secrets, source code, without ever capturing the prompt.

For agents, the same join runs on permissions as well as activity. An OAuth grant with drive.readonly is a capability; the files Alice can actually read, and which of them contain SSNs, is the exposure. Strac resolves both, so a shadow agent shows up with "can reach 193 sensitive files" before it has read a single one, and "did read payroll.xlsx" the moment it does.

Shadow AI Detection Without Surveillance

There is a bright line between detecting AI usage and surveilling employees. Good detection records the service, the app, the device, the user, and whether sensitive data was involved. It does not record what people type or see. Strac holds that line explicitly: no keystroke logs and no screenshots anywhere in the product. That is what makes a detection program deployable without a fight from employees or works councils.

The same principle applies to agents. Strac does not collect prompts or content by default when metadata answers the question. A finding needs the principal, the permission, the resource, the action and the classification, not the conversation.

🎥 Shadow AI Detection Tools: How Strac Detects Shadow AI

Watch how Strac surfaces AI activity and the sensitive data that comes near it, in real time, from the endpoint:

Strac redacting sensitive data in AI and MCP traffic. The agent inventory, identity resolution and activity attribution described above sit on top of this data layer.

✨ How to Detect Shadow AI Continuously: A Step-by-Step Playbook

Detection is not a one-time audit. The playbook below sets up the sensors and connectors once, baselines for two weeks, and then runs continuously, so a new tool or agent is reviewed in days rather than at the next annual survey.

Strac seven-step playbook for how to detect shadow AI continuously, grouped into setup, a two-week baseline, triage and enforcement
Steps 1 to 6 are read-only. Enforcement starts at step 7, once the baseline shows which tools, agents and data classes are actually in play.
  1. Deploy an endpoint agent across the fleet so browser, desktop, and CLI AI use is all in view.
  2. Name your known AI services in the destination catalog so managed tools are reported by name and everything else stands out as unmanaged.
  3. Connect the provider control planes where agents and sensitive data overlap most: Google Workspace and AWS first, then GitHub and Slack, then Claude and ChatGPT, then Salesforce. Read-only is enough for discovery.
  4. Baseline for two weeks in audit mode to see which tools, agents, users, and data classes are actually in play.
  5. Triage the unmanaged tools and agents: sanction the good ones with an owner, flag the risky ones, request owners for the rest.
  6. Watch the sensitive touches: where regulated data meets an AI tool or an agent's permissions is where you act first.
  7. Feed detection into enforcement: once you can see it, you can block or warn on the data that matters and revoke the grants that should not exist.

Metrics to Track for Shadow AI

  • Share of AI activity going to unmanaged tools (the core shadow-AI metric).
  • Number of distinct AI services and apps reaching your data.
  • Users and devices involved, and the trend over time.
  • Sensitive touches: how often regulated data comes near an AI tool.
  • Time from a new tool appearing to it being reviewed.
  • Agents with an accountable owner, as a percentage of agents discovered.
  • Agents found only by a sensor, which tells you how much your API-only coverage would have missed.
  • Time from finding to remediation for Critical and High agent findings.

✨ DLP Is the Answer: Remediate Shadow AI Before Data Leaks

Detection tells you shadow AI is happening. DLP is what stops the leak. The moment sensitive data heads to an AI tool, pasted into a browser prompt, dragged into an upload, opened by a desktop AI app, or overshared in a file an agent can reach, Strac's content-aware DLP remediates it in real time. This is why so many teams run Strac for web GenAI DLP: it is the remediation layer that turns "we found shadow AI" into "the data never left."

Strac gives you the right response for each surface, set per data type:

Strac redacting sensitive data such as SSNs and card numbers in a Slack message in real time
Redact: Strac masks the sensitive values in place (here in Slack) and leaves the rest usable. The same redaction runs across email, tickets, docs, and more.
  • Redact / mask: strip the sensitive value (an SSN, card number, or secret) and leave the rest, across SaaS, email, and tickets.
  • Block: deny a paste, upload, or file open on the browser and endpoint when the data is too sensitive to risk.
  • Warn / coach: on the browser and endpoint, coach the user in the moment and let them proceed with a logged reason.
  • Revoke access: remove public and external sharing on Google Drive, SharePoint, and Box so an AI agent (or anyone) can't reach the file.
Strac blocking a sensitive paste into an AI tool on the browser
Block on the browser and endpoint: Strac stops a sensitive paste into a GenAI tool before it is submitted.
Strac warning a user before a sensitive file upload to an AI tool
Warn and coach: Strac stops the user before a sensitive file reaches an AI tool, and can require a justification.
Strac revoking public links and external access on Google Drive so an AI agent cannot reach the file
Revoke access: Strac removes public access and external members on Google Drive, SharePoint, and Box, closing the door an AI agent could walk through.

Because detection and DLP live in the same platform, you see the shadow AI and remediate the data with one policy and one audit trail, across SaaS, browser, endpoint, GenAI, and MCP.

✨ Detect, Then Govern, with Strac

Strac is an AI agent security platform built on the sensors that already run shadow AI detection. The browser extension, the endpoint agent and the MCP sensor see the tools and the agents; the provider connectors for Google Workspace, AWS and Bedrock AgentCore, GitHub and Copilot, Slack, Salesforce and Agentforce, Claude, ChatGPT and Cursor see the grants, apps, runtimes and sessions. Strac joins all of it into one graph: Agent → Principal → Permissions → Resources → Sensitive data.

That graph answers the four questions for every agent you find. Identity: what is acting and which credential it uses, resolved across all six patterns with a stated confidence. Authorization: what that credential can do, directly and through delegation. Activity: what it did, from provider audit logs, the Anthropic and OpenAI compliance APIs, and Strac's own sensors. Data: which sensitive resources it can reach and which it touched, from the classified inventory Strac already maintains for DLP. Identity tools stop at "can." Guardrail tools stop at the model. The sensors are what let Strac see the agents in patterns E and F that API-only discovery cannot attribute at all.

Detection is step one; the same Strac agent lets you govern and control what you find. Explore the Shadow AI hub, learn to prevent shadow AI without banning AI, compare shadow AI detection tools, and see the broader endpoint DLP agent and GenAI DLP.

Much shadow AI runs on the device itself, so detection has to reach the endpoint. Strac's endpoint agent discovers AI usage and local agents on Mac and Windows without keystroke logging or screenshots.

Strac detecting shadow AI usage from the browser, listing each GenAI tool employees reach with users and visits
How Strac detects Shadow AI: the browser extension surfaces each cataloged GenAI tool employees reach, how many users, and how often, without recording prompts, replies, or files.

Want to block or govern a tool? See how to block ChatGPT at work and AI usage monitoring.

👉 Book a demo and we will run shadow AI and agent discovery read-only against your Google Workspace or Slack tenant on the call, including the OAuth grants and local MCP servers nobody registered.

🌶️ Spicy FAQs on Detecting Shadow AI

What is shadow AI detection?

Shadow AI detection is the practice of finding the AI tools and AI agents your workforce uses without approval, mapping them to the devices, users and identities behind them, and spotting when sensitive data comes near them. It covers three layers for tools (network, browser, endpoint) and a fourth for agents: the provider control planes where OAuth grants, app installs and agent runtimes live. It is the first step of any shadow AI program, because you cannot write policy or enforce anything for what you cannot see.

How do you detect shadow AI?

Watch which AI services each device reaches, in the browser and from desktop clients, plugins, and scripts, name the unmanaged ones, and flag when sensitive data comes near them. Strac does this on the endpoint without reading prompts or logging keystrokes.

How do you detect shadow AI agents?

Pull the provider control planes first: OAuth tokens by client_id in Google Workspace, app inventories in Slack and GitHub, AgentCore runtimes in AWS, connected apps and bot fields in Salesforce, and the Anthropic and OpenAI compliance APIs. Then add sensors for what those APIs cannot see: local agent processes, MCP config files, secrets in the execution environment, and browser sessions driven by computer-use agents. Join the two and label every attribution with its confidence.

Can you detect shadow AI without monitoring employees?

Yes. Detection should record the AI service, the app, the device, and whether sensitive data was involved, never the content people type. Strac captures no prompts, keystrokes, or screenshots, and for agents it records metadata (principal, permission, resource, action) rather than conversation content.

Is network monitoring enough to find shadow AI?

No. Network and CASB tools miss desktop AI clients, IDE plugins, and scripts calling AI APIs, and they can't cleanly tie a connection to a user and a file. They also miss every agent that acts through a provider's own API with a legitimate OAuth grant, because that traffic never looks unusual. An endpoint agent plus the provider control planes cover those paths.

How long does it take to detect shadow AI?

With an endpoint agent it's near real-time: the moment a device reaches an AI service it's recorded. Provider-side agent discovery is close behind; a small inventory of OAuth grants, apps and runtimes comes back within the first session, and audit feeds are polled every few minutes after that. Survey-based inventories, by contrast, are stale the day they're finished.

Customer story

“Don’t just alert on problems, fix them.”

Scott Roberts, Chief Information Security Officer, UiPath

  • UiPath
  • Crypto.com
  • Inmar Intelligence
  • thredUP
  • Paymentology
  • Enveda
  • Genesis Molecular AI
  • MeridianLink
More customer stories →
What is shadow AI detection?
How do you detect shadow AI?
How do you detect shadow AI agents?
Can you detect shadow AI without monitoring employees?
Is network monitoring enough to find shadow AI?
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