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November 15, 2026
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21
 min read

AI Agent Security: Every Agent, What It Can Reach, What It Did (2026)

AI agent security answers four questions per agent: what is acting, what can it do, what did it do, what sensitive data can it reach. How to answer all four.

AI Agent Security: Every Agent, What It Can Reach, What It Did (2026)
ChatGPT
Perplexity
Grok
Google AI
Claude
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TL;DR

  • AI agent security means discovering every AI agent and AI-enabled automation in your company, resolving the identity and credentials each one runs as, mapping the permissions that identity actually has, observing what the agent really did, and joining all of that to the sensitive data it can reach.
  • Most tools stop at the first step. An inventory of agents tells you nothing about blast radius.
  • Strac builds the full Agent to Identity to Permission to Resource to Sensitive Data graph across Google Workspace, AWS Bedrock AgentCore, GitHub Copilot, Slack, Salesforce Agentforce, Claude, ChatGPT and Cursor.
  • That graph becomes findings with proof and remediation you can apply in one click or hand to the provider console.

Somewhere in your company right now, an AI agent is reading a file it should not be able to see. It is not malicious. Nobody attacked it. An engineer connected Claude Code to Google Drive with a scope that was easy to click, a finance analyst pointed ChatGPT at a shared folder, a platform team gave a Bedrock agent an IAM role copied from a human, and Salesforce quietly spun up an Agentforce integration user with the same object access as a sales admin.

AI agent security is the discipline of finding every one of those agents, resolving what identity each one runs as, mapping what that identity can do, observing what the agent actually did, and joining it all to the sensitive data behind the permissions. Done right, it answers four questions for every agent, bot and AI-enabled automation in the business:

  1. Identity. What is acting, who owns it, and which principal or credential does it use?
  2. Authorization. What can that principal do?
  3. Activity. What did it actually do?
  4. Data. What sensitive data can it reach, and what sensitive data did it touch?

This guide is written for the CISO or security engineer who has to answer those questions by Friday. It covers what makes agents a different problem from service accounts and SaaS apps, the six identity patterns agents actually use, the controls that work, the findings that matter on day one, and how Strac's agent security platform answers all four questions across the systems where agents live: Google Workspace, AWS and Bedrock AgentCore, GitHub and Copilot, Slack, Salesforce and Agentforce, Anthropic Claude, OpenAI ChatGPT and Cursor.

Strac AI agent inventory: 187 agents discovered, 41 with no owner, 17 with sensitive reach and 6 critical, with each agent's identity, reach and risk
Every agent in one place, with the identity it runs as, how much sensitive data it can reach and why it is rated the way it is. Two of the five agents shown have no owner at all.

Related: see agentic AI security and how an MCP gateway governs what agents can access and send.

✨ What is AI agent security, in one sentence

AI agent security is identity security plus data security, applied to software that decides its own next step.

That last clause is the whole problem. A traditional SaaS app or service account does what its code says. An agent interprets an instruction in natural language, picks tools, chains calls, reads whatever its credential can read, and writes wherever its credential can write. The blast radius of an agent is not its code. It is the union of every permission behind every credential it can borrow.

So AI agent security cannot be a prompt filter or a model firewall alone. It has to be built on a graph:

Agent → runs as / delegates through → Principal (OAuth grant, GitHub App, Slack bot, Salesforce user, IAM role) → has → Permissions (scopes, roles, repo grants, ACLs, IAM actions) → permits → Resources (Drive files, Slack channels, repos, Salesforce objects, S3 buckets) → contain → Sensitive data (PII, PHI, PCI, secrets, source code, financial data)

Activity joins the same graph: Agent → Principal → action → Resource → Sensitive data → Destination. The first chain tells you what could happen. The second tells you what did. Keeping them separate, and joining them only through evidence, is the difference between a tool that produces a CISO-grade finding and a tool that produces a theory.

Strac four-questions graph: one Claude Code agent traced from its delegated OAuth principal and drive.readonly permission to 8,214 files and 193 sensitive ones
The four questions as one chain. Identity and authorization describe what could happen; the activity record at the bottom is joined to the chain only through audit evidence.

Why AI agent security is a data security problem, not a model problem

The first generation of agentic AI security focused on the model: guardrails, prompt-injection filters, output scanning. Those controls are necessary and Strac uses them at the data layer. But they answer the wrong first question. A guardrail cannot tell you that a stale Zapier automation still holds a live HubSpot token, or that a Copilot coding agent has contents:write on payments-prod, or that an Agentforce bot has no owner.

Here is what an inventory like the one above tends to surface in a mid-size company in the first week:

  • Agents nobody knew about. OAuth grants to AI clients that were approved by individual users, Slack apps installed by a team lead, IAM roles created for a hackathon and never deleted.
  • Agents nobody owns. The spec rule we hold ourselves to: an agent with no accountable owner and recent activity or a valid credential is a High finding, every time.
  • Agents that can reach far more than they use. Write, delete or admin capability granted and never exercised in a 30-day window. That is not a theoretical risk. It is the exact gap a prompt injection exploits.
  • Agents running as people. The automation signs in with a shared login, or drives a browser session that is already authenticated as Alice. The provider's audit log says Alice did it. It did not.

None of these show up in a model-layer tool, because none of them are about the model.

✨ The six identity patterns AI agents actually use

If you only remember one section of this guide, make it this one. Agents do not have one kind of identity. They have six, and your ability to attribute an action to an agent, and to revoke that agent's access, depends entirely on which pattern it uses.

Pattern
What it means
Example
How well you can attribute it
A. Delegated OAuth
The agent acts on behalf of a human through an OAuth grant
Claude → OAuth → Alice → Google Drive
Strong, if you know the client_id and the user
B. App, bot or service identity
The agent has its own non-human principal
Slack bot token, Salesforce integration user, GitHub App installation
Usually strong; ownership often needs metadata
C. Cloud workload identity
A cloud-hosted agent runs as a workload principal
Bedrock AgentCore runtime → IAM role
Excellent for permissions and CloudTrail correlation
D. API key, PAT or static secret
The agent authenticates with a long-lived credential
GitHub PAT, vendor API key, Slack token
Often weak ownership; endpoint and secrets telemetry helps
E. Browser or session identity
The agent drives a browser session a human already logged into
Cowork or computer-use → Alice's open Salesforce tab
The provider sees Alice; attribution needs browser or endpoint evidence
F. Shared or human login
The agent logs in with a human or shared account
An automation signs into the CRM with team credentials
Low confidence unless another sensor correlates it
Strac identity patterns diagram: the six ways AI agents authenticate, from delegated OAuth to shared logins, each with its attribution confidence
Patterns E and F are highlighted because the provider log names a person, not the agent. In this inventory 12 of the 187 agents rely on them, and each one opens a High finding.

Patterns A through D are what most identity-security and SaaS-security tools can see, because they leave a footprint in the provider's admin API. Patterns E and F are where API-only tools go blind, and they are growing fastest, because computer-use agents and browser agents are the easiest kind to deploy. More on that below.

A practical rule from this table: do not call every service account, bot or OAuth app an AI agent. Store "is an agent" separately from "is a non-human identity." Your NHI inventory might have 4,000 entries. The ones that interpret instructions and choose actions are the ones that need agent-grade controls, and conflating the two buries the real risk in noise.

✨ AI agent access control: authorization is not activity

The most common mistake in agentic AI security programs is inferring did from can.

Authorization is what the provider's control plane says is possible: a Claude OAuth grant for Alice has drive.readonly; Alice is a member of Finance; Finance has Reader on the Payroll folder. Activity is what the audit log says happened: Google's token audit shows client_id=Claude called the Drive API on behalf of Alice at 10:04; Drive's audit shows Alice's identity opened payroll.xlsx. Data is what Strac's inventory knows about that file: it contains SSNs and compensation.

Three different sources, three different confidence levels, one finding. Store them separately. Join them through evidence. Show the join on the finding. A security team that has been burned by a "risk score" nobody could explain will trust the first tool that shows its work.

Strac agent detail view for Claude Code: the agent, principal, permission and sensitive-data chain above a timeline of what it actually did
One agent, can versus did: the OAuth principal it delegates through, the permission, the 193 sensitive files behind it, and four actions from this morning, each tagged with its evidence source.

Notice the last line in that screenshot: granted versus used. Overprivilege is measured over a policy window, not guessed. gmail.readonly was granted and never exercised in 30 days, so the recommendation is to drop it, and the remediation is reversible and one click because Google exposes a bounded admin API for revoking a user's third-party app tokens by client_id. That is what "least privilege for AI agents" looks like when it is operational rather than aspirational.

What AI agent security has to cover, system by system

Agents live where your data lives. An AI agent security platform earns its keep by covering the handful of systems where agents, credentials and sensitive data overlap most, and by being honest about what each integration can and cannot see.

System
What agents look like there
What you need to pull
Strac coverage
Google Workspace
Third-party OAuth grants to Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini extensions, MCP servers
OAuth token inventory and audit, user and group membership, Drive permissions, Drive activity
Discovery, delegated-identity resolution, effective access, activity, one-click token revoke
AWS + Bedrock AgentCore
First-class agent runtimes running as IAM roles or workload identities
Runtime and agent identities, IAM policies, CloudTrail management and data events, S3 and Secrets Manager reach
Discovery, targeted IAM policy simulation, CloudTrail attribution, policy-delta remediation
GitHub + Copilot
GitHub Apps, PATs, Copilot coding-agent sessions
App permissions and repo selection, enterprise audit log with agent-session fields, secret scanning
Discovery, permission mapping, agent-session attribution, repo-scope recommendations
Slack
Bots and apps with scopes and channel grants
App inventory, granted scopes, resource grants, enterprise audit
Discovery, scope and channel mapping, restrict or uninstall where admin APIs allow
Salesforce + Agentforce
Connected apps, integration users, Agentforce bots
Connected app and user permissions, Event Monitoring with connected-app, bot and session attribution
Discovery, object-level reach, bot and session attribution, token revoke where valid
Anthropic Claude
Claude Enterprise, Claude Code, Cowork sessions, MCP connections
Compliance API: usage, sessions, local Claude Code activity
Discovery, session-level attribution, data-layer redaction via Claude DLP
OpenAI ChatGPT
ChatGPT Enterprise users, GPTs, app connectors
Compliance Platform: conversation, audit, auth and app logs
Discovery, app-call attribution, data-layer redaction
Cursor
Cloud and local coding agents
Enterprise admin and audit APIs, environment signals, hooks and OpenTelemetry
Discovery, session attribution, endpoint correlation

Two rules we hold to in building this. First, use provider control-plane APIs and audit logs before you build an inline proxy for anything. Proxies see traffic; control planes see permissions, and permissions are the thing you need to change. Second, every integration ships a capability manifest that says, per provider, exactly what Strac can discover, resolve, attribute and remediate, so that "coverage" on a dashboard is a measured number and not a marketing claim. Breadth of integrations is not the metric. Useful agent connections, identity-to-resource joins and explainable sensitive-data findings are.

✨ Where API-only agent discovery goes blind, and how sensors fix it

Here is the scenario that breaks every SaaS-posture tool on the market.

Alice is logged into Salesforce in Chrome. A computer-use agent, Cowork or similar, takes control of that browser session and exports a report. Salesforce's audit log records, correctly, that Alice exported a report. No OAuth grant was created. No service account exists. There is nothing in Salesforce's admin API that can prove an agent did it.

The only way to attribute that action is to join the provider's activity with evidence from where the agent actually ran: the browser and the endpoint. Process and session, URL and domain, account context, file upload or download, timing, and where available the AI session ID. Strac marks that attribution as correlated rather than provider-native, because honesty about confidence is part of the product.

Strac correlated event: Salesforce says Alice exported a report, while Strac browser and endpoint evidence shows a Cowork agent drove her session
The join, made visible: what Salesforce knows, next to what the endpoint and browser sensors saw in the same 43 seconds. The finding states its confidence so a reviewer can disagree with it.

This is the structural advantage of an agent security platform built on top of browser DLP and endpoint sensors that are already deployed for data loss prevention:

  • Local agents and credentials. The endpoint sees Claude Code, Codex and Cursor processes, MCP configuration files, local file access, shell and tool execution, browser control, and the credentials and secrets sitting in the execution environment. API-only products cannot reliably see any of it.
  • MCP as an identity and action bridge. For every MCP invocation Strac observes, it normalizes the server, the tool, the requesting agent or session, the downstream principal if known, the action category, the resource or destination, and the sensitive data detected in the request and the response. That gives much stronger did evidence than posture APIs alone. If you are new to this surface, start with MCP DLP and the risks it addresses: prompt injection over MCP, the confused deputy and shadow MCP servers.
  • Shadow AI agents. The same sensors that power shadow AI detection see the agent nobody registered, because the agent still has to run somewhere.

These are optional evidence adapters into the same graph, not a separate product. Deploy them where you need the confidence; the inventory still works without them.

✨ Excessive agency: the AI agent security findings that matter on day one

A good finding is deterministic, explainable and actionable. An opaque ML risk score is none of those things, and a security team cannot defend it in an audit. Strac computes severity from six factors you can see on every finding: sensitivity × action capability × breadth × sanctioning × observed use × attribution confidence.

These are the findings worth building a program around:

Finding
Logic
Default severity
Unsanctioned agent can access sensitive data
Is an agent, not sanctioned or unknown, reachable sensitive resources > 0
High
Agent observed accessing sensitive data
Activity touches a classified resource
High; Critical for secrets or highly regulated data combined with a risky capability
Sensitive data sent to an external destination
Observed send, export or tool response to an external or untrusted destination
Critical
Agent can read secrets and execute
Secret retrieval or KMS decrypt plus an execute capability on the same principal
Critical
Overprivileged agent
Write, delete or admin capability granted and never observed over the policy window
Medium to High, by blast radius
Ownerless live agent or credential
No accountable owner plus recent activity or a valid credential
High
Stale agent with active credential
No activity for N days but the credential is still valid
Medium
Shared human credential used by an agent
Attribution relies on a shared or human login or session instead of a dedicated identity
Medium to High
Agent has broad wildcard access
All repos, all channels, * resources
High when sensitive data is present

Every row in that table is a question a CISO already asks. The difference is that with the graph in place, the answers come with proof.

Strac critical finding: a Bedrock AgentCore agent can read production secrets and invoke Lambda, with IAM and CloudTrail proof and a policy delta
Every finding shows what we know, how we know it, which principal and credential were used, which permission allowed it, which resource and data were involved, what happened, and what to do about it, split into what Strac can change and what must be changed in the provider console.

🎥 How to contain a compromised AI agent: remediation you can apply

Discovery without remediation is a report. The reason agent security programs stall is that the fix usually lives in someone else's console, and the security team is reduced to filing tickets.

Strac's remediation model is built on one safety principle: separate discovery credentials from remediation credentials. You can deploy agent security read-only on day one. Write access is opt-in per provider and per action, and every remediation option states exactly what will change, whether it is reversible, and whether Strac can apply it or you need the provider console.

The data layer of the platform in action: Strac redacting sensitive data in AI and MCP traffic. Agent security adds the identity, permission and activity layers on top of this.

What that looks like per provider:

  • Google Workspace: revoke a user's third-party app tokens by client_id in one click; remove a Drive permission where Strac already manages it. Otherwise, a deep link and the recommended scope change.
  • Slack: restrict or uninstall an app where Enterprise Admin APIs and granted scopes allow. Otherwise, show the requested scopes and resources with the admin link.
  • AWS: no automatic IAM mutation. Strac generates the exact policy delta, the role and resource recommendation, and the console link. You review and apply.
  • GitHub: recommend repository selection, permission reduction or uninstall; apply through the provider workflow unless the authorization type has a verified admin write API.
  • Salesforce: provider workflow for most app and access changes; token revocation only where it is technically and administratively valid.
  • Anthropic, OpenAI, Cursor: workspace controls only where admin write APIs are documented and bounded; otherwise a policy finding with an admin deep link.

And for the human side of remediation: the owner can acknowledge the finding, sanction the agent, or create an exception with an expiry, so the inventory stays honest instead of filling up with snoozed alerts.

✨ How to secure AI agents: a 30-day plan

If you are starting from zero, this is the order that produces results fastest. It mirrors how we sequence the product itself.

Strac 30-day plan to secure AI agents: inventory and identity, permissions and the data join, activity and findings, then policy, tracked by two metrics
The seven steps below, grouped into four weeks. Track two numbers from the start: the share of agents with an owner and the median time to remediate.
  1. Build the inventory first. Connect the providers where agents and sensitive data overlap most: Google Workspace and AWS first (they have the best delegated-OAuth and workload-identity models and the largest data surface), then GitHub and Slack, then Claude and ChatGPT, then Salesforce. Do not start with the long tail.
  2. Resolve identity before you argue about permissions. For every discovered agent, record the owner, the identity pattern (A through F above), and the credential. Flag everything with no owner.
  3. Map direct and delegated permissions. Scopes, roles, repo grants, ACLs, IAM actions. For AWS, simulate the handful of actions that matter (secret retrieval, data export, execute) rather than trying to prove the universe.
  4. Join to your sensitive-data inventory. This is the step most agent security tools skip because they do not have one. If you already run DSPM or DLP, the classified-resource map exists; agent security is a new set of principals pointed at it.
  5. Turn on activity. Provider audit logs first; MCP, browser and endpoint sensors where you need attribution for patterns E and F.
  6. Ship the nine findings. Work the Critical and High ones with the owners. Measure the time from finding to remediation and the percentage of agents with an accountable owner. Those two numbers are your program.
  7. Set the policy. Codify what "sanctioned" means, require an owner for every agent, set a staleness window for credentials, and use the AI agent governance framework to make it stick across teams.

For the broader program, including the frameworks regulators are converging on, see AI agent governance frameworks and the three operating practices: discover AI agents, protect AI agents and monitor AI agents.

What to deliberately not do in year one

Programs fail from ambition as often as from neglect. Things we recommend against, and have chosen not to build first:

  • Do not build a universal IAM theorem prover before shipping. Reliable discovery of high-value agents and credentials, direct and delegated permissions, attribution of important actions, and findings a CISO will act on beat a perfect effective-permission engine that never ships.
  • Do not inline-proxy every SaaS and cloud request. Control-plane APIs and audit logs first.
  • Do not promise one-click revocation everywhere. Only automate where the provider offers a bounded, well-understood admin write API. Everywhere else, generate the exact change and link to the console.
  • Do not collect prompts and content by default. Metadata answers most of the questions. Content ingestion should follow your existing data-handling controls, which is why agent security belongs on the same platform as DLP.
  • Do not score risk with an opaque model before you have exhausted deterministic signals. Show the six factors. Let the team argue with them.

✨ Agentic AI security vs AI agent security: the same problem, two names

The two terms get used interchangeably and mostly describe the same work. Agentic AI security tends to be used when the concern is autonomy: an agent that plans, chains tool calls and acts without a human approving each step. AI agent security tends to be used when the concern is the specific software: Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, an internal LangChain service.

The distinction matters less than what both need, which is the same three answers: which agents exist, what each one can reach, and what data actually moved. An autonomous planner with read-only access to a test folder is a smaller problem than a single-step script holding a production database credential. Autonomy is not the risk multiplier. Reach is.

✨ AI agent security platforms compared: where each approach stops

Most tools that claim agent coverage are really covering one layer of it. The honest way to compare them is by what they can see and what they can do about it.

ApproachWhat it seesWhat it misses or enforces
StracEvery AI agent and MCP server on the device, what data each can reach, and the sensitive data moving through prompts, files and tool callsAudit, warn, redact or block per channel
Identity and NHI governance (Okta, Microsoft Entra)Which machine credentials exist and who owns themNothing about what the agent actually reached, or whether the data was sensitive
AI gateways (Cloudflare, Kong, AWS)Model traffic that is routed through the gatewayAgents running locally, MCP servers, and files that never touch the gateway
EDR (CrowdStrike and peers)Process execution and file events on the endpointPrompt contents, MCP tool calls, and whether the data was regulated
CASB and SSE (Netskope, Zscaler)Sanctioned SaaS traffic from the networkCoding agents on the laptop and their local MCP configuration

The pattern is that identity tells you who an agent is allowed to be, the network tells you what it sent, and the endpoint tells you what it ran. None of those tell you whether the thing it touched was a customer record. That is the layer Strac starts from, which is why agent findings name the data at risk rather than just the tool.

Strac's AI agent security platform

This sits inside Strac's wider AI security posture management surface, which inventories every AI tool, agent and MCP server on your devices and ranks the findings to fix first.

Strac already runs the data layer for AI at hundreds of companies: AI DLP in the browser and on the endpoint, MCP DLP for agent tool calls, shadow AI discovery, and a classified inventory of sensitive data across SaaS, cloud and endpoints.

Agent security adds the other three questions on top of that inventory. In practice that means:

  • Discover every agent, bot and AI-enabled automation across Google Workspace, AWS and Bedrock AgentCore, GitHub and Copilot, Slack, Salesforce and Agentforce, Claude, ChatGPT and Cursor, plus the local agents and MCP servers that only an endpoint can see.
  • Resolve identity for all six patterns, with an explicit attribution confidence on every record.
  • Map permissions directly and through delegation, and measure granted versus used over a policy window.
  • Attribute activity from provider audit logs, the Anthropic and OpenAI compliance APIs, and Strac's own MCP, browser and endpoint sensors.
  • Join to sensitive data so every permission answers what does this expose and every data finding answers who or what can touch it, and what did they do.
  • Produce findings with proof and remediation that is read-only by default, opt-in per provider, and reversible or clearly labeled when it is not.

Deploy it read-only in an afternoon. The first inventory is usually the most uncomfortable meeting of the quarter, and the most useful.

👉 Book a demo and we will run the inventory against your own Google Workspace, AWS or GitHub tenant live on the call.

🌶️ Spicy FAQs on AI agent security

What is AI agent security?

AI agent security is the practice of discovering every AI agent and AI-enabled automation in an organization, resolving the identity and credential each one runs as, mapping the permissions that identity has, observing what the agent actually did, and joining that to the sensitive data it can reach. It combines identity security, data security and runtime monitoring for software that chooses its own actions.

How do I prevent AI agents from exfiltrating sensitive data?

Start with reach, not prompts. Remove write, export and send capability the agent never uses, keep secrets and execute off the same principal, and redact sensitive data at the MCP, browser and endpoint boundary before it reaches the model. Then watch activity for sends, exports or tool responses that carry classified data to an external destination, and treat each one as a Critical finding.

How is AI agent security different from LLM security or AI guardrails?

LLM security protects the model: prompt-injection filtering, output scanning, jailbreak resistance. AI agent security protects what the model can do: the credentials it borrows, the permissions behind them, the data it can reach and the actions it takes. You need both, but guardrails cannot tell you that an ownerless agent holds a live production token. The graph can.

How is it different from non-human identity (NHI) security?

NHI security inventories every service account, API key and bot. AI agent security is the subset that interprets instructions and chooses actions, plus the join to sensitive data. Treat "is an agent" and "is a non-human identity" as separate flags. Most NHIs are not agents; every agent uses at least one NHI or borrows a human identity.

Can you fully prevent prompt injection against AI agents?

No, and any vendor who says otherwise is selling a filter. Prompt injection is a property of models that follow natural-language instructions. What you can do is bound the blast radius: least privilege on the agent's credential, no secrets-plus-execute on one principal, sensitive data redacted before it reaches the model, and activity monitoring that catches an injected agent doing something its owner never asked for.

What regulations apply to AI agent security?

No regulation names "AI agents" yet, but every existing control framework already covers them through their identities and data. SOC 2 and ISO 27001 require access control, least privilege and logging for every identity, human or not. GDPR, HIPAA and PCI DSS regulate the sensitive data agents read regardless of who read it. The EU AI Act and the NIST AI RMF add transparency and accountability expectations for AI systems, which in practice means an owner, an inventory and an audit trail for each agent. The agent inventory is the artifact every one of those audits will ask for first.

Does securing AI agents mean blocking them?

Rarely, and you choose per channel. Strac runs four enforcement modes: audit, warn, redact and block. Most teams start everything in audit, move the risky paths to warn or redact, and reserve block for the few flows where regulated data must never leave. Alongside that, give every agent an owner, scope its credential to what it actually uses, redact sensitive data at the boundary, and keep a reversible way to switch it off. Teams that ban agents outright get shadow AI agents instead, which is the same risk with no audit trail.

Customer story

“Don’t just alert on problems, fix them.”

Scott Roberts, Chief Information Security Officer, UiPath

  • UiPath
  • Crypto.com
  • Inmar Intelligence
  • thredUP
  • Paymentology
  • Enveda
  • Genesis Molecular AI
  • MeridianLink
More customer stories →
What is AI agent security?
How do I prevent AI agents from exfiltrating sensitive data?
How is AI agent security different from LLM security or AI guardrails?
How is it different from non-human identity (NHI) security?
Can you fully prevent prompt injection against AI agents?
Discover & Protect Data on SaaS, AI, MCP, Endpoints & Cloud
Strac provides end-to-end data loss prevention for all SaaS and Cloud apps. Integrate in under 10 minutes and experience the benefits of live DLP scanning, live redaction, and a fortified SaaS environment.

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  • UiPath
  • Crypto.com
  • Inmar Intelligence
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  • Enveda
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